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DISSENTING OPINIONS
It is a settled practice in this country for judges to
disagree. That is a part of our American system.
We believe the Bar and the people generally have much
faith in the judges of our courts who do not join the majority.
The Supreme Court of the United States has divided on
Constitutional questions five to four, six to three or eight
to one. Criticism of the majority or the minority under this
American system of ours is not wholly justified. On the
contrary, it is strong evidence that the judges who dissent
are independent, and this American idea is not confined to
the judiciary. Ministers disagree in the religious world and
great scientific experts in the scientific world disagree. How
can it be said it is a dishonor to our American system for
great judges to disagree as to the application of what can
be done by Congress under the provisions of the Constitu-
tion? But, on the other hand, it gives the man on the farm
and the laborer a chance to debate in their own way some of
these great questions; and that is not all, it has a marked
tendency to educate the people as to what the power of
Congress is under the Constitution.
A student of the political history of this country will
find that this same great fact is always true. Many very
distinguished statesmen and orators have disagreed as to
state rights and federal rights and to just what could be done
under our Constitution and be legal. This difference of
opinion is not at all dangerous. It does not mean to destroy
the Constitution. On the contrary, it gives all people a chance
to do some hard thinking as to just what the Constitution of
the United States really means.
No lawyer, or judge, or statesman, or great leader,
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either in the business world or any other of the many activities of life,
has worked out a 100 per cent formula for the American people to
follow.
In this American life of ours, we have many religions, and it is a
great truth that our Constitution does not recognize a state religion,
but leaves to all our people the right to worship God Almighty according
to the dictates of his own conscience. What a sound doctrine that is.
It is written in our fundamental law and in the constitutions of the
different states of the Union, but not all our people follow the great
fact laid down in our Constitution some years ago.
In this state we have had our share of dissenting opinions by the
Supreme Court. I am not aware of any decision where a dissent has
been later adopted by the Supreme Court as the law of the state.
All over the land there is a great growing interest as to our courts.
A good judge is a valuable asset to any community; a poor judge is an
awful liability. On the whole, we have been quite fortunate in having
honest, upright, far-reaching judges on the bench, and it is becoming
general throughout the country that when, either by appointment or by
election, a good judge is found and elevated to the bench-the very
highest of our positions in this country-that it is good, hard common
sense to keep such a judge in the public service.
M. A. HILDRETH, President,
State Bar Association.
SOME QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE APPLICATION
OF THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" DOCTRINE
By DEXTER MERRIAM KEEZER
In 1876, the United States Supreme Court, in the now famous case
of Munn v. Illinois, first gave sanction in this country to the doctrine
that an enterprise may become "affected with a public interest," and in
consequence be subject to public regulation. The doctrine has been
steadily expanded, bringing within its scope an increasing range and
diversity of enterprises. There is a basis for the belief that the classifica-
tion of enterprises held to be "affected with a public interest" will con-
tinue to be enlarged. It therefore becomes important to see whether
there is any economic pattern into which such enterprises can be fitted.
The legislatures may pass laws declaring an enterprise to be "affected
with a public interest," and subject to the liabilities which may attach
themselves to that classification; but this is not conclusive, for the
circumstances are always a subject of judicial inquiry.
Chief Justice Taft, in the Wolff Packing Company case, divided
the public interest businesses into three classes; but this classification
is not complete, for it does not include all cases, nor does it exclude cases
that are not clothed with public interest.
Specific Considerations Leading to Judicial Approval of
Regulation in the Public Interest
In Munn v. Illinois the Supreme Court of the United States found
the regulation by the State of Illinois of rates charged by grain elevators
